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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Pensacola Division  
 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through   ) 
BILL McCOLLUM, et al.    ) 
       ) 
Plaintiffs,       ) 
       ) 
v.        )    Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT  
       ) 
       ) 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF   ) 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., ) 
       ) 
Defendants.       ) 
__________________________________________) 
 
 
 
BRIEF FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AS AMICI  
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
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INTEREST OF AMICI 
Amici Curiae United States Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell, and 
Senators Orrin Hatch, John Barrasso, Kit Bond, Sam Brownback, Jim Bunning, Richard 
Burr, Saxby Chambliss, Tom Coburn, Thad Cochran, Susan Collins, Bob Corker, John 
Cornyn, Mike Crapo, Jim DeMint, John Ensign, Mike Enzi, Chuck Grassley, Kay Bailey 
Hutchison, James Inhofe, Johnny Isakson, Mike Johanns, Jon Kyl, George LeMieux, 
John McCain, James Risch, Pat Roberts, Richard Shelby, Olympia Snowe, John Thune, 
David Vitter, and Roger Wicker are all United States Senators of the One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress. 
As United States Senators, amici have a keen interest in the constitutional issues 
at stake in this litigation that transcends any opposition they may have voiced to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) (hereinafter 
“PPACA” or “Act”) on policy grounds.  All Members of Congress have taken oaths to 
uphold the Constitution of the United States.  While our constitutional system is built on 
both vertical and horizontal checks and balances, Members of Congress are, by virtue of 
their oath, under a responsibility of their own to uphold the Constitution of the United 
States and to ensure that the Legislative Branch stays within the bounds of the powers 
afforded it by the Constitution. 
Amici are cognizant of their responsibility to uphold the Constitution, and as a 
result they raised two constitutional points of order during consideration of the health 
care bill.  On December 23, 2009, Senator Ensign raised a point of order that the bill 
would violate the Constitution because Congress‟ enumerated powers in Article I, section 
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8 do not give it the authority to mandate that people engage in activity (i.e., buy insurance 
meeting federal requirements) or be fined.  The same day, Senator Hutchison raised a 
point of order that the bill would violate the Tenth Amendment, which states that “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
Each point of order received the support of all senators who voted against the legislation 
(with the exception of one senator who was absent from the votes on these two points of 
order).   
Where, as in this case with respect to the PPACA‟s Individual Mandate, Congress 
legislates without authority, it damages its institutional legitimacy and precipitates 
divisive federalism conflicts like the instant litigation.  The long term harms that the 
PPACA may do to our governmental institutions and constitutional architecture are at 
least as important as are the specific consequences of the PPACA.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The Individual Mandate Exceeds The Commerce Power. 
 
This nation was founded on and continues to be characterized by its unique 
system of dual sovereignty, in which the federal government is limited to exercising the 
enumerated powers granted it by the Constitution, while states retain the general police 
power.  See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (Madison) (“The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined” while “[t]hose 
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”).  This 
balance of power was conceived by the Framers of the Constitution to “ensure protection 
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of our fundamental liberties” by “prevent[ing] the accumulation of excessive power,” 
thus “reduc[ing] the risk of tyranny and abuse from either” state or federal government.  
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).  As Chief Justice Marshall observed:  
Th[e] [federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated 
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it ... is now 
universally admitted.  But the question respecting the extent of the powers 
actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as 
long as our system shall exist.”  
 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819) (quoted in United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 566 (1995)).  In modern times, debate has arisen particularly over the scope of 
the power granted to the federal government “[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the 
several States....”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
While the past century has seen a general expansion of the subject matter 
committed to the federal government under the Commerce Clause, in recent years the 
Supreme Court has rejected the notion of an infinitely elastic clause, recognizing the 
potential for it to be stretched to eliminate any meaningful limits on the federal 
government‟s power.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995); United 
States v. Morrison, 29 U.S. 598, 607-08 (2000).  Defendants‟ arguments in this case 
threaten to undermine the remaining limits on Commerce Clause power, harming the 
Constitution‟s framework by allowing the federal government to overreach its 
enumerated powers and invade the legitimate province of the States. 
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A. The Commerce Clause Power Does Not Authorize 
Congress To Mandate The Purchase Of A Particular 
Product, Only To Regulate Commercial Activity In Which 
People Are Engaged. 
 
The Individual Mandate provides that, subject to certain very narrow exceptions, 
“an . . . individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, 
and any dependent of the individual . . . is covered under minimum essential coverage for 
such month.”  See PPACA § 1501(b).  Noncompliance results in the assessment of a 
monetary penalty.  See PPACA § 1501(b)(1).  The Mandate therefore compels otherwise 
passive individuals to engage in economic activity against their will, by requiring them to 
obtain health insurance regardless of whether or not they wish to purchase a policy.  As 
such, the Mandate dramatically oversteps the bounds of the Commerce Power which has 
always been understood as a power to regulate, and not to compel, economic activity.
1
   
The Supreme Court noted in United States v. Lopez that Congress‟ power to 
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several States” has three permissible applications:   
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce.  Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate 
commerce.  Finally, Congress‟ commerce authority includes the power to 
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce. 
 
                                                 
1
 Indeed, this is the only meaning compatible with the plain meaning of the Constitutional text.  In the 
Eighteenth Century, as today, to “regulate” was defined in terms that presuppose action upon some object 
or activity that already is already extant. See 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 
(1755) (defining “regulate” as “(1) to adjust by rule or method. (2) to direct.”).  See also Merriam 
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 985 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “regulate” variously as “to govern or direct 
according to rule,” “to bring under the control of law or constituted authority,” “to make regulations for or 
concerning,” “to bring order, method, or uniformity to,” to fix or adjust the time, amount, degree, or rate 
of”).  A regulator comes to an existing phenomenon and orders it. 
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).  Commercial 
activity that is local and intrastate may be regulated if, in the aggregate, such “activity” 
exerts a “substantial economic effect” on the interstate economy.  See Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).  Furthermore, under the third prong of Lopez, the test is not 
whether the regulation itself would substantially affect interstate commerce, but whether 
the activity regulated so affects commerce.   
Congress‟ findings explicitly and exclusively invoke its power under the 
Commerce Clause as the constitutional authority for the Individual Mandate, and they 
make clear that it is the third Lopez prong upon which the Mandate is supposedly based. 
See PPACA §1501(a).  However, these findings misstate the Lopez test and strongly 
suggest that Congress misunderstood the nature of its authority.  Compare PPACA 
§1501(a) (emphasis added) (finding that “The individual responsibility requirement 
provided for in this section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially 
affects interstate commerce”) with Lopez 514 U.S. at 558-59 (emphasis added) 
(“Congress‟ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce”).  In short, Congress did not find that the 
“activity” (really, the “inactivity” or lack of activity) substantially affects commerce.  
Rather, Congress found that the regulation – the Mandate itself – affects commerce.  This 
puts the constitutional cart before the horse, and the Supreme Court has never embraced 
such reasoning. 
Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV  -EMT   Document 121    Filed 11/18/10   Page 9 of 20
6 
 
Indeed, in more than 200 years of debate as to the proper scope of the Commerce 
Power, the Supreme Court has never suggested that the Commerce Power allows 
Congress to impose affirmative obligations on passive individuals, or to punish 
individuals for failing to purchase a particular product.  To the contrary, every landmark 
Commerce Clause case has dealt with congressional efforts to regulate different kinds of 
activity under the Commerce power.  In every significant Commerce Clause case the 
Supreme Court has always had to decide whether Congress may regulate a given form of 
activity.  See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (considering whether interstate 
navigation was “commerce”); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (whether 
manufacturing was “commerce”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937), 301 U.S. 1 (whether labor relations could be regulated as “commerce”); Wickard, 
317 U.S. 111 (whether economic activity was too “local” to be regulated under the 
Commerce Power); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (whether carrying a weapon in a “school zone” 
could be regulated on the basis of supposed effects on commerce); Morrison, 29 U.S. 598 
(whether gender-motivated violence could be regulated under the Commerce Clause).  
Though the Court‟s decisions in these cases reflect different and evolving views of the 
Commerce Power, not one can be read to even hint at a power to impose affirmative 
obligations.  All are concerned with the regulation of activity that is already ongoing, not 
with the antecedent, and frankly unprecedented, question of whether it is constitutional 
for the federal government to force someone to engage in commercial activity to begin 
with.   
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Inasmuch, then, as the Individual Mandate regulates (and punishes) a decision not 
to engage in an activity, it falls beyond the settled scope of the Commerce Clause.  There 
is simply no precedent for Congress using the Commerce Power to compel economic 
activity by inactive persons.  Indeed, Congress‟ own analyses have repeatedly recognized 
this. 
For example, Congress has charged the Congressional Budget Office with 
providing it with objective and nonpartisan analyses of federal programs. See 
http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/factsheet.cfm.  The CBO has noted that in 200 years, 
Congress has “never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful 
residence in the United States.”  See Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of 
an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance, at 1 (Aug. 1994).   
More recently, and as this Court has noted, another non-partisan office within 
Congress has reached much the same conclusion.  The Congressional Research Service 
has been called Congress‟ “think tank.”  See State of Florida v. United States Department 
of Health and Human Services, Order and Memorandum Opinion on motion to dismiss, 
October 14, 2010 at 61 [hereinafter “10/14/2010 Mem. Op.”].  Among its responsibilities, 
the CRS provides Congress with non-partisan analyses of the constitutionality of 
proposed federal laws.  It has questioned whether the Commerce Clause “would provide 
a solid constitutional foundation for legislation containing a requirement to have health 
insurance.”  Congressional Research Service, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health 
Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis, July 24, 2009 at 3 (cited in 10/14/2010 Mem. Op., 
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at 61-62).  In fact, the CRS has called the constitutionality of the individual mandate “the 
most challenging question” and moreover has noted that “it is a novel issue whether 
Congress may use the clause to require an individual to purchase a good or service.”  Id.   
Since the enactment of PPACA, the CRS has reiterated its questions about the 
constitutionality of the Individual Mandate under the Commerce Clause.  In fact, the day 
after this Court issued its Memorandum Opinion on Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss, the 
CRS updated its analysis of the PPACA, again noting the novelty of what Congress was 
doing by way of the Individual Mandate.  See Congressional Research Service, Requiring 
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis, October 15, 2010, at 
8-9.  It then noted that, in „general, Congress has used its authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate individuals, employers, and others who voluntarily take part in some 
type of economic activity.”  Id. at 11 (emphasis added).  And it questioned whether, like 
in the PPACA, “regulating a choice to purchase health insurance is” such an activity at 
all.  Id. (emphasis added).  In short, the CRS observed that the Individual Mandate in 
PPACA is a difference in kind, not just in degree, from the type of power that Congress 
in the past has relied upon the Commerce Clause to exert: 
While in Wickard and Raich, the individuals were participating in their 
own home activities . . . , they were acting on their own volition, and this 
activity was determined to be economic in nature and affected interstate 
commerce.  However, [under the Individual Mandate] a requirement could 
be imposed on some individuals who do not engage in any economic 
activity relating to the health insurance market.  This is a novel issue: 
whether Congress can use its Commerce Clause authority to require a 
person to buy a good or a service and whether this type of required 
participation can be considered economic activity. 
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Id. (emphasis added) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005)).  The CRS opined that, quite simply, “it may seem like too much of a bootstrap to 
force individuals into the health insurance market and then use their participation in that 
market to say they are engaging in commerce.”  Id. at 11-12.     
This Court has already found that “the power that the individual mandate seeks to 
harness is simply without prior precedent,” and “the Commerce Clause and Necessary 
and Proper Clause have never been applied in such a manner before.”  10/14/2010 Mem. 
Op., at 61.  Likewise, the federal court hearing a similar challenge brought by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia has ruled that the individual mandate exceeds the “high 
watermark” of the Commerce Power.  See Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-188, Mem. 
Op. at 18 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010).   
Indeed, every court to consider this issue has found it to be novel and 
unprecedented.  Even the only court to uphold the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate thus far has noted the case as one of "first impression" since "[t]he [Supreme] 
Court has never needed to address the activity/inactivity distinction advanced by 
plaintiffs because in every Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been some 
sort of activity."  Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-CV-11156, Mem. Op. at 
15 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010) (emphasis added).   
As the Supreme Court has stated several times, the “utter lack” of such statutes 
for more than 200 years strongly suggests the “absence of such power.”  Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 908 (1997) (emphasis in original); id. at 905 (if “earlier Congresses 
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avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the 
power was thought not to exist”); id. at 907-908 (“the utter lack of statutes imposing 
obligations [like the one in Printz] (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to 
Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such power”) (emphasis in original); id. at 
918 (“almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice [at issue 
in Printz] tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here”). 
B. Defendants’ Efforts To Characterize The Individual Mandate 
As Regulating “Activity” Fail Because They Destroy All 
Limits On the Commerce Power.  
 
In defending the Mandate, the Defendants have shied away from arguing that 
Congress may regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.  Instead, Defendants have 
tried to advance several overlapping theories as to why the decision not to buy insurance 
is in fact a form of regulable economic activity.  They have variously suggested that the 
choice not to obtain health insurance is activity subject to federal regulation because it is 
a “volitional economic decision,” Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 43, see 
also Def. Mem. In Support of Mot. For Sum. Judgment at 16, 27-28; or because 
individuals will “almost certainly” need health care in the future, Def. Mem. In Support 
of Mot. To Dismiss at 35; or because the failure to obtain insurance is some form of 
supposedly active “self-insurance,” see Def. Reply Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 
at 18, see also Def. Mem. In Support of Mot. For Sum. Judgment at 41.   
These semantically clever arguments must fail because they “prove” far too much.  
To uphold the Individual Mandate on any of these bases would represent the boldest 
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expansion of the Commerce Power in history.  It would also defy the Supreme Court‟s 
clear signal, in cases like Lopez and Morrison, that it will once again police the limits of 
the Commerce Power.  If Congress can use the Commerce Power to punish a decision not 
to engage in a private activity, on the basis that the future consequences of this choice, in 
the aggregate, would substantially affect interstate commerce, there is seemingly no 
private decision Congress could not regulate or no activity it could not force private 
citizens to undertake (subject, presumably to the protections of the Bill of Rights) when, 
in the aggregate, it concludes that doing so would benefit the economy.  For example, this 
same rationale would allow Congress to punish individuals for not purchasing health-
related products, like vitamin supplements, on the ground that their failure to do so would 
increase health care costs by not ameliorating or preventing health conditions, like 
osteoporosis. 
This is precisely the type of reasoning criticized by the Supreme Court in Lopez, 
where it warned that, under the Government‟s theories, 
it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as 
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been 
sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the Government‟s arguments, we are hard 
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate. 
 
514 U.S. at 564; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (to allow regulation of non-economic 
activity at issue would enable the federal government to regulate almost any activity, 
including “family law and other areas of traditional state regulation.”).  
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Such a result would yield Commerce Clause jurisprudence both unrecognizable 
and incompatible with the Founder‟s vision of Congress‟ powers being limited and 
enumerated.  See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (Madison) (“The powers delegated 
by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined” while 
“[t]hose which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”).  
The Court has warned of the risks that such an expanded Commerce Clause would pose 
to our system of dual sovereignty:  
the scope of the interstate commerce power „must be considered in the light of our 
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects 
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of 
our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is 
national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.‟  
 
Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 at 37 (quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
2
  
II. Defendants Would Turn The Commerce Power Into An 
Impermissible Federal Police Power. 
 
A. The Mandate Is A Classic Exercise Of The Police Power. 
Almost every affirmative legal obligation binding on citizens arises under a 
state‟s police powers.  For example, compulsory vaccination, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. 11, 12, 24-25 (1905); drug rehabilitation, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
665 (1962); and the education of children, cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 
(1972), have all been upheld on the basis of state police powers.  
                                                 
2
 Similar consequences would attend acceptance of Defendants‟ apparent theory that Congress may 
regulate anticipated commerce rather than incidents of actual commerce.  See Def. Mem. in Support of 
Mot. to Dismiss at 35.  Such an understanding would permit Congress to manufacture its own potentially 
limitless jurisdiction. 
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A state‟s police power is also the basis for the only other “Individual Mandate” 
that requires individuals to obtain health insurance.  Massachusetts law requires most 
adult residents to obtain health insurance amounting to “creditable coverage” and, 
analogously to the PPACA, imposes a penalty for failure to do so.  See  Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 111M, §2 (2008) (upheld pursuant to state “police power” in  Fountas v. Comm’r of 
Dep’t of Revenue, 2009 WL 3792468 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2009) (dismissing suit), 
aff’d, 922 N.E.2d 862 (Mass App. Ct. 2009), review denied, 925 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 
2010)).  Congress‟ findings in support of the Individual Mandate note the existence of a 
“similar requirement” in Massachusetts and make clear that Congress‟ intent in enacting 
the Mandate was to emulate this state measure.  See PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(D) (finding 
that “[i]n Massachusetts, a similar requirement has strengthened private employer-based 
coverage: despite the economic downturn, the number of workers offered employer-
based coverage has actually increased.”). 
By contrast, in the rare instances where Congress imposes affirmative obligations 
on passive individuals, it does so pursuant to enumerated powers other than the power to 
regulate interstate commerce.  A classic example is the draft, authorized by Congress‟ 
power “to raise and support Armies.”  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; Selective Service 
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 383, 390 (1918).  Congress has never before attempted to impose an 
affirmative obligation to purchase a product or service, or participate in any kind of 
activity through the Commerce Clause. 
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B. The Supreme Court Has Foreclosed Conversion of the 
Commerce Power Into A Federal Police Power. 
 
The fundamental problem with Defendants‟ theories, therefore, is that they would 
result in the conversion of the Commerce Power into a federal “police power” – a result 
which the Supreme Court has repeatedly held constitutionally impermissible. 
The Supreme Court has been vitally concerned with policing – and preserving – 
the boundary between the federal commerce power and the state‟s police powers.  This 
boundary, the Court has explained, is an important bulwark for liberty and an integral 
feature of our non-unitary constitutional order which, the Supreme Court has explained, 
favors liberty.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J. and O‟Connor, J. concurring) 
(explaining that limits on commerce power essential to fulfilling the “theory that two 
governments accord more liberty than one” which “requires for its realization two distinct 
and discernable lines of political accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal 
Government; the second between the citizens and the States”).  Accordingly, the Lopez 
Court warned of extending the Commerce Clause so far as to “effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.”  See id. at 557.  See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19 (explaining that 
“[t]he Constitution . . .   withholds from Congress a plenary police power”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
If, however, a decision not to engage in an activity which substantially affects 
interstate commerce renders individuals subject to coercive regulation under the 
Commerce Clause, there will not only cease to be a limit on Congress‟ own power under 
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the Commerce Clause, there will also cease to be a workable distinction between 
Congress‟ broad but bounded Commerce Power and the states‟ general police powers, 
hemmed in only by the Bill of Rights and the supremacy of federal legislation.  Such a 
ruling would, as the Supreme Court warned in Lopez, “obliterate the distinction between 
what is national and what is local.”  514 U.S. at 557.  This result would be incompatible 
with the federal design of our Constitution and should be rejected by the Court.   
CONCLUSION 
 For all the foregoing reasons, amici curiae Members of the United States Senate 
respectfully request that the Court grant Plaintiffs‟ Motion for Summary Judgment.   
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